A transnational turn is certainly afoot in the discipline of history. While world history as a fi eld is hardly new, it has usually played second fi ddle to the histories of particular nation-states and the regions carved out by area studies. But recently almost every national history fi eld and regional fi eld has recognized the need for a gaze that looks across hallowed borders and oceans with fresh eyes.
1 As the forces of globalization have simultaneously produced an astonishing degree of connection and an acute deepening of socioeconomic and political divisions, globalization's casualties and challenges command urgent attention. Even historians, forever leery of the analytical sin of presentism, have felt compelled to enter en masse the debate about globalization and its discontents. Given how much scholarly discussion on the subject has been generated disproportionately within other fi elds and often without a nuanced historical sensibility, this is a welcome intervention indeed.
But while historians as a group are only beginning to enter the fray, individual historians and various subfi elds of course are anything but new to discussions of inequality between peoples and uneven developments on a transregional or even global scale. This article concerns itself primarily with two particularly vibrant approaches: world history and historical studies of masculinity. Both have been profoundly committed to exploring issues of domination and difference, and they each have developed vital critical vocabulary for narrating their complex histories. At fi rst glance, that would make the two fi elds seem like natural allies, or at least easy interlocutors, at this moment in time and in the profession's history. But to the contrary and somewhat paradoxically, there has been a vexed relationship between world historians and historians of masculinity (and of gender and sexuality more broadly). They have largely remained segregated in their own institutional and intellectual spaces, conferences and journals included. From there they have eyed one another with some degree of skepticism and occasionally outright suspicion. Even when their thematics do overlap, historians of gender and sexuality rarely see themselves writing world history, and vice versa.
2 What's the problem? How can it be solved? And what's to be gained?
This article builds on conversations generated by a double-session roundtable we organized at the 2007 meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, D.C., titled "Narratives of Difference and Domination: World Histories and Studies of Masculinity." Featured as a Presidential Session and including scholars working on various world "areas," the panels drew a large audience and lively debate. The session also generated interest in Europe, where conversations about world history are beginning to gather steam. We were invited by the German-language journal Historische Anthropologie to publish an article on our refl ections under the title "Männerdomänen? World History trifft Männergeschichte-das Beispiel der Lateinamerikastudien" in November 2008. 4 Because the relationship between gender, sexual- ity, and world history is of more longstanding concern within the U.S. academy, we were eager to have our essay made available in English. We thank both Historische Anthropologie and the Journal of World History for permitting us to reproduce it here.
We contend that the oft vexed issues separating world historians and historians of gender and sexuality are not only ones of perceptions and labels (although mistaken attributions do matter 5 ), but also foremost a matter of diverging intellectual trajectories and partially incommensurate categories. Other trends in each fi eld notwithstanding, at this juncture, it is a heavily materialist world history that faces off with a predominantly culturalist history of gender and sexuality. Diagnosing such disciplinary unevenness, however, is different from asserting that "never the twain shall meet." In trying to establish intersections between the two fi elds, we use this article to bring a third fi eld into the mix: United States-based Latin American studies, an area of study that has long combined these traditions and hence offers particular insights on the challenges of bringing them together.
Most promising from our point of view is the recent scholarship from Latin American studies that illuminates how world history and histories of gender and sexuality converge naturally, as it were, around the theme of masculinity. World history commonly centers its analyses on domains of life in which men are primary actors, be it patterns of trade and labor exploitation, or empire building and state formation. Histories of gender and sexuality, on the other hand, regularly examine why certain domains or individuals are coded as "masculine," what such codings mean, and how they matter to larger processes. The Latin Americanist literature offers important models for combining these two topics and is suggestive of how world history can usefully be narrated as the story of masculinities. This article is not intended as a literature review of Latin Americanist histories of gender and sexuality, or even masculinity.
6 Rather, we invoke Latin American studies as a research 5 Wiesner identifies a central problem in the outdated views each field holds of the other but she also notes conceptual differences. Sexuality, and area that often has fl uidly blended culturalist and materialist traditions and focused on masculinity in ways that are highly relevant to debates within world history today.
Uneven Developments, Unequal Interests: Gender History and World History
What then troubles the conversation between world historians and scholars of gender and sexuality? Different starting points for one. Gender history fi rst emerged from and has remained animated by a deep and fruitful commitment to challenging universal claims. For decades, its practitioners have been fi ne-tuning their critical tools to interrogate narratives that presumed to include all yet elided thorny issues of power, exclusion, and difference. Moving from 1970s social history and Marxist theory to cultural and literary analysis in the wake of the linguistic turn, historians of gender and sexuality have striven to produce ever more nuanced accounts of the dynamics of gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity at the heart of all historical phenomena. 7 There is no question that this scholarly emphasis has rendered what seemed like familiar stories of, say, state formation, industrialization, or nationalism newly complicated, and in so doing has deepened our understanding of these broader historical processes.
8 But the focus on difference and the distrust of false universalisms has also made historians of gender and sexuality habitually suspicious of mega-narratives of any kind. World history is without a doubt a new mega-narrative-surely the most ambitious thus far proponed. It raises the specter of a pernicious iteration of universal history, particularly since world historians often rely on the 1970s social theory that historians of gender and sexuality spent so much time deconstructing.
Meanwhile, a growing number of scholars of gender and sexuality have in recent years themselves embarked on studies that look across different regions and areas of the world.
9 This has implied abandoning the traditional framework of the nation, which the rich literature on gender and nationalism had already denaturalized from within but simultaneously and ironically also propped up as a privileged unit of analysis. While these scholars do look globally instead of nationally, however, they perform their work not under the sign of "world history" but of "transnational dynamics" (usually concrete instances of global interaction). Focused overwhelmingly on the twentieth century (especially the last half), this scholarship is more immediately attuned to postcolonialism and postmodernism and from this vantage point rather wary of the world history paradigm as mired in irredeemable Euro centrism. Fears that world history is little more than a ruse to reassert the West's myths about itself as the sole bearer of civilization and economic freedom loom large here, if sometimes in exaggerated and unfounded forms.
Indeed, much of the new scholarship in world history has radically upended these very teleologies and challenged historians of gender and sexuality to rethink assumptions about empire and economic development.
10 This newer literature on world or global history, which partially grew out of but mainly superseded the earlier comparative civilizational studies and eurocentric accounts of the West against the rest, has put to rest a number of scholarly commonplaces about globalization. It has highlighted that the contemporary moment of the late twentieth and early twenty-fi rst centuries, so often hailed as unique for their startling degree of market integration and population fl ows, is only the most recent, even if a particularly intense, instantiation of global connectivity. Furthermore, the new world history has been especially concentrated on the period of European imperial expansion (1500 -1900) as another key moment in the evolution of transregional markets and political regimes but only to undercut the presumed inevitability of European imperial domination and economic hegemony in the modern world.
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It is true, however, that in this revisionist world history enterprise, questions of the political economy have taken center stage and so has the goal of (re-)mapping global connections. Related to this is the prominence of nineteenth-and early twentieth-century social theory in word history discourses (albeit often as an object of critical appraisal) and a traditional, institution-centered view of politics. As world historians themselves have noted, a deep engagement with culturalist theoretical paradigms from anthropology or literary studies remains the exception rather than the rule.
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Not surprisingly then, the cultural production of difference and its political deployment in all spheres of life, issues that are of paramount importance to historians of gender and sexuality, inhabit the analytical periphery of the world historical debate. More frustrating still, while a materialist emphasis does not per se preclude gender analysis-one only needs to recall the many superb feminist labor histories written within national frameworks-much of world history marches along merrily without paying much attention to gender and sexuality at all. Beyond their presumed transparent relation to demography, gender and sexuality remain altogether invisible, not to mention inoperative as categories of historical analysis.
En-gendering World History within Area Studies: The Case of Latin America
But the materialist and culturalist approaches that often separate world history and gender and sexuality studies are by no means inherently incompatible. For reasons specifi c to the history of Latin American studies as a fi eld, Latin American history anticipated the concern of both world history and transnational cultural studies with international dynamics of domination, dependency, and difference. 13 It has long been both comparative and interested in how a particular region fi ts into a global story. Like world history, the dominant narratives of Latin American history have been those of empire building, global capitalism, and state formation. At the same time, Latin Americanist feminist scholarship and studies of sexuality have been heavily materialist, even as they incorporated the linguistic turn's emphasis on meaning. Scholars have engaged poststructuralist calls to see gender as a multilayered fi eld of power, and sexuality as constituted through ideology and performance. Yet what they have most produced is an outpouring of social and political history on gender and sexuality-in labor relations, government institutions, social movements, and national modernization. Much of this literature reworks, rather than jettisons older notions of political economy and the state, even as Foucault and Lacan enter more prominently into the framework. It is not that Latin Amercanists "lagged behind" or failed to take enough of a cultural turn, but rather that different questions were being asked about Latin America than about Europe and the United States, which compelled different uses of-and investments in-materialism, gender, and sexuality.
As was true of other area studies fi elds, Latin American studies emerged in full during the Cold War, at the behest of U.S. government funding, for the purpose of assessing the fi tness of "developing countries" for capitalist democracy, or at least military compliance with NATO. Yet area studies were never mere tools of empire, but hotly contested and productive of a wide range of knowledges. For Latin American studies, whose "area focus" was the fi rst and most enduring region of U.S. imperial design, this was especially true. Indeed, since the mid nineteenth century, Latin America was a constant site of U.S. military intervention, economic investment, and democracy-building projects, an agenda that received zealous recommitment in the aftermath of the 1959 Cuban Revolution. This ensured that Latin American studies, from its inception, was intensely polemical terrain, pitting Cold War hawks and reform-minded liberals against a growing leftist critique from inside the United States that denounced U.S. actions in the Caribbean and South America as imperialist and antidemocratic. From within Latin America itself, Latin American studies gave conceptual and fi nancial backing to a host of radical projects at odds with U.S. State Department goals, from dependency theory's indictment of Latin America's systematic underdevelopment by the industrialized world, to Latin America's identifi cation with Pan-Third Worldism and the Non-Aligned Movement.
14 The discipline of history, together with historically minded social sciences, often served as a vital "proving ground" for arguments about the origins of Latin America's political violence, unequal development, and utopian revolutions. Often mobilized in unabashedly partisan ways, Latin American studies, even in its most nuanced forms, became a fi eld disproportionately critical of U.S. intervention and the legacies of European colonialism.
Materialist frameworks have been central to most questions motivating Latin American studies, from debates over economic development and persistent poverty to arguments about imperialism and the supposed legacies of Hispanic authoritarianism. Marxism has enjoyed a particularly lasting privilege, and in various incarnations: economic histories of commodities, labor histories of class formation and resistance, a voluminous Gramsci-inspired scholarship on the state and hegemony. 15 Marxism's endurance has sprung not only from its con- To be sure, Latin American studies' materialist commitments built upon and elaborated a number of problematic binaries that also haunt world history: developed versus undeveloped, fi rst world versus third world, imperialists versus nationalists, democracy versus tyranny. Such dichotomies were fi rst produced in U.S. political and academic culture in relationship to Latin America, and later became integral to other "non-Western" area studies (Africa, Asia) sponsored by the United States. In our contemporary moment, this taxonomy intimately informs discussions and policy toward the Middle East, arguably constituting as great a legacy as older discourses of Orientalism, if not greater. 17 LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984) .
In the more recent labor historiography, see Florencia Mallon, Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transition, 1860-1940 (Princeton And yet, like world history, much of the most innovative work in Latin American studies has actively sought to upend Eurocentricism, even while emphasizing global dynamics of difference and domination. Arguments that Latin America's very birth was as an extension of sixteenth-century European kingdoms, and that, in the nineteenth century, Latin America consolidated far more independent republican nation-states than did Europe, have challenged cherished notions about the cohesive origins and spread of modernity. 18 The voluminous historiography on colonialism and imperialism has stressed Latin American agency and the ways such agency mattered to very different outcomes (sometimes "more enlightened" outcomes).
19 Political histories of the twentieth century have emphasized that, despite being an object of overt outside intervention and violence, Latin America also produced numerous inspired models for the rest of the world.
20 More de-provincializing still, has been the simple insistence that Latin America has always been part of "the West."
Masculine Conquest, Family Men, and Male Laborers
Histories of gender and sexuality have been an integral part of Latin American studies for a good twenty-fi ve years, and have been especially important to challenging essentialist notions of Latin American difference (backwardness) and narratives of unidirectional change. 18 Walter Mignolo has argued that Iberia saw the Americas as a place of self-realization rather than as a radical Other. Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000) . Benedict Andersen drew early attention to ways that the Americas, including Latin America, rather than Europe, created the first bonafide nation-states. Interestingly, questions about masculinity were present from the very beginning, thanks partly to the way women's history and gender history entered Latin American studies almost simultaneously, rather than consecutively. This sprang from the relatively "later timing" of gender analysis in Latin American history, itself the result of a certain hostility from Marxism. Yet while discussions of gender and sexuality have radically reworked materialist paradigms (Marxism in particular), they have maintained a central engagement with narratives of political economy.
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Within this, they have made the masculine nature of men, and its making, a key subject of study. For this reason, they provide inspiration for integrating a central world-historical concern, the changing face of the political economy, with a critical aspect of gender history, the shifting nature of masculinity. Three genre lessons stand out.
First, one of the most long-lived traditions for considering masculinity within Latin American history are studies of Spanish and Portuguese conquest and colonialism in the Americas. This is a literature, beginning in the 1980s and including more recent innovations, that has stressed the importance of sexuality to the religious and political authority of Inca and Aztec warriors, from ritual celibacy to penal bloodletting and cross-dressing. Historians have also considered how Pre-Columbian empires were maintained through royal "taxes" in female virgins and young males. For Iberian empires, scholars have examined the Spanish conquistador and priest as different kinds of masculine subjects, and the key role of sexual violence and forced Christian marriage.
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Joining the literature on sex and conquest has been a vibrant scholarship about sexual honor, in particular, the early idea that male sexual honor (via the enforcement of female chastity) was key to acquiring political offi ce and economic power in the colonial world. 23 counted as "masculinity" in these studies has ranged widely and undergone an evolution away from confl ating masculinity with patriarchy to the idea of masculinity as a contested constellation of various empowerments and disempowerments, which apply to subaltern men as well as elites. 24 Most recently, scholarship on sexual symbolism has upended heterosexual binaries entirely by showing how many forms of power in the Pre-Colombian and Iberian worlds were understood in terms of same-sex or transsexual gendered formations. 25 Collectively, what such studies of Latin American history offer world history is a long tradition of seeing masculinity as key to understanding the world historical moment of encounter and conquest between Europe and the Americas. This is a literature that has focused heav-ily on high politics of statecraft and empire building. It links kinship to governance and economy, but it does not locate the "origin" or "function" of masculinity as the family. Importantly, it is a literature especially indebted to anthropology, a discipline whose insights world historians have barely begun to absorb. Indeed, while the cross-pollination of history and anthropology happened in multiple fi elds, it was especially strong in Latin American studies. This was a fusion borne of anthropology's long focus on ethnic Otherness (Indians) and symbolic systems (religion), together with Latin America's special place in the U.S.-American imagination as a "fi eldwork site" for studying alterity. A majority of the fi rst wave of women's studies on Latin America were by anthropologists as were the fi rst gendered histories of Iberian conquest in the Americas. 26 Anthropology's most valuable gift to Latin American history, and most promising possibility for world history, has been to model ways for thinking about the cultural production of difference (gendered, sexual, racial, religious), while allowing scholars to hold fast to narratives about political domination and economic transformation.
A second genre of masculinity studies within Latin American history with important implications for world history is the rich literature on gender and modernization. This encompasses a series of debates about the relationship between nation building and the promotion of male-headed families and civic domesticity. As the story goes, from the late nineteenth century on, an array of constituencies-industrial leaders, liberal professionals, feminists, the labor movement, and the Left-all pushed varying ideals of nuclear family in which men were breadwinners and women dedicated themselves to scientifi c motherhood. This is the "modernization of patriarchy" thesis, and some version of it plays a central role in historiographies as diverse as that on 26 the Mexican Revolution, Perón's Argentina, Brazilian myths of racial democracy, and Puerto Rican anti-imperialism. 27 It is the linchpin for arguments about the resolution of "the social problem" of nineteenthcentury industrialization, the birth of the welfare state, the failures of socialism, and the emergence of the modern "homosexual" as a deviant and criminal. 28 As historians would have it, for a good 120 years, there was a concerted effort to get even very poor men to settle down, marry, and commit to becoming producers for the nation and providers for families. This is a productive, domesticated, hetero-normative, and nationalist masculinity that is promoted with astonishing breadth by a range of very different kinds of political projects. It is the hegemonic masculinity of the family man.
Obviously, this line of argument has its counterparts in the vast literature on the United States and Europe on domesticity and citizenship (as well as homosexuality), which locate origins quite a bit earlier. 29 But the Latin Americanist scholarship is especially noteworthy for two reasons in particular. First, because, for better or worse, there has been an overarching emphasis on the role of the state in promoting male-headed family, or the state as a site of contestation over what kind of masculine citizenship was desirable. Debates over hegemony have especially underscored the crucial role of gender and family in everyday forms of governance. Second, the Latin Americanist literature has paid much attention to the ways the ideal of modern family was in constant dialogue with debates from elsewhere in the world, especially the United States and Europe. The aspiration for modernity and the anxiety that Latin America was not modern enough were constant themes for historical actors. So, Latin Americanist historians have paid attention to the circulation of ideas from abroad: looking at pan-American conferences on eugenics, or the export of gender models through international development schemes like USAID, UNICEF, and Protestant missionaries.
30 Latin Americanists also have given conscious attention to the ways such internationally produced ideologies as socialism, Catholic social doctrine, liberalism, and fascism, become global languages, spoken with different accents.
Different versions of the family man as the basis of national belonging are obviously present in scholarship on twentieth-century Asia and Africa. And there, too, the ideal worked in hegemonic ways: ideologically powerful in state policy, if never a reality for most people. One interesting challenge for world history is to make connections, or speak to the differences, between these different family man fantasies that occurred globally, and that are often promoted by similar international actors (missionaries, development agencies) or ideologies (liberalism, socialism). But it is also worth recognizing the tension between tracing different histories of masculinity versus using masculinity as an analytical category. There is a certain danger that in looking for the place of masculinity in different projects (colonial empires, modernizing nation-states) we come up with strikingly similar stories across vastly different societies and temporal moments. Certain kinds of masculinity are extremely modern and very specifi c to certain places, but that doesn't mean masculinity as an analytic concept is useless for asking questions for other periods.
One last genre lesson from Latin American history that deserves mention is labor history. This literature has explored not only how gender divisions of labor are fundamental to the economy but, in particular, the importance of international dynamics in their creation. Studies of masculinity and chattel slavery speak to obvious trans-Atlantic ties between gender, commerce, and violence. Likewise, there is an important scholarship on the masses of itinerate and roving migrant men who throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century made up the bulk of workers in mines and haciendas: mestizo copper miners in Chile, Chinese guano workers in Peru, Almayra tin miners in Bolivia, Maya banana workers in Guatemala, indentured South Asian laborers in Trinidad. 31 These are the worlds of men created by export economies and coercive liberal republics, in which quite often employers and companies were "foreigners" (British, U.S.-American). In the mid twentieth century, many of these men will undergo a domestication as both U.S. companies (modeling Henry Ford's philosophy of welfare capitalism) and Latin American welfare states (with their eyes on European state models) actively promote marriage and family as the basis of social peace and labor control. As scholars point out, a great deal of the labor militancy for which Latin America became famous sprang from men's reconstituted masculinity as "family men" who demanded "rights" to a just standard of living for wives and children. 32 for making masculinity a central object of study in stories where "there are no women," and where the preferred story line is one focused on global fl ows of commodities, including human bodies. Obviously, world history needs to pay just as much attention to femininity and the production of goods (the women usually are "there"). Not all world history need privilege economy and trade. But given existing tendencies within the fi eld, Latin American labor history offers some instructive lessons. Looking at the construction and various forms of masculinity in labor systems (as distinct from merely recognizing that all the workers were men) changes the overall picture of "the economy" and brings new things into view. The everyday forms of coercion that underlay sugar plantations or nitrate mines involved ritual violence, containment, or contests between different men, different deployments of masculinity. Men with families were by no means a natural or obvious way to organize production; on the contrary, domestic masculinity had to be consciously promoted or imposed by states, employers, and religion, and it was often resisted. In other words, world history needs to take up the ways masculinity constitutes a terrain of power through which the world's workers, bosses, and products get produced.
Narrating World History through Masculinity
In offering these examples from Latin American history, we do not propose that Latin American studies is somehow better positioned than other area studies to model for world history on issues of gender and sexuality. All area fi elds-Europe, Asia, Africa, U.S.-America, and so forth-have engaged feminism and studies of sexuality. All are being transformed by discussions of the global and transnationalism, and some have produced outstanding work on the history of masculinity in an imperial context. 33 But it is worth not fl attening these into a generic singular "area studies." Each area studies fi eld emerged out of different concerns and political contexts, even if (in the United States) they all share Cold War roots. Our exploration of Latin American studies is meant as an invitation to think about the trajectories of other 33 The huge literature on masculinity that has emerged from British studies includes a few studies that address the function of masculinity in empire building. See Mrinalini Sinha, area fi elds and fi eld-specifi c ways of narrating masculinity as a global history.
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that world history should not be conceived merely as a matter of mix and stir, or of comparative show and tell of case studies of area "civilizations." In fact, one of the most exciting and radical things about world history is the way conventional "areas" such as "Latin America," "Asia," "U.S.-America," or "Europe" begin to look very different when stories are told that consciously breach those gulfs, when we think of Haiti as producer of Enlightenment thought, early modern China as foundational to the making of the Latin American economy, the Philippines as a part of the Americas rather than Asia, or the Ottoman Empire as integral to the formation of European self-understandings rather than Europe's other. The promise of world history lies precisely in its capacity to reframe how we think of "area" and to ask new questions about points of dialogue, confl ict, and interaction taking place across world regions.
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Placing different histories of masculinity into dialogue with each other sheds light on the very processes that construct regional areas to begin with. Let us conclude with two examples to drive home this point, one from modern and one from early modern history. Taken together they illustrate that masculinity, like globalization, is best explored in terms of the longue durée to avoid facile conclusions about its "essential features." Our examples stem from the world history classroom, where much of the hard conceptual work is taking place at this point as more and more college campuses in the United States offer world history courses and an increasing number of historians of gender and sexuality participate in teaching them. 35 of Theodore Roosevelt (United States), Cecil Rhodes (Britain), and Domingo Sarmiento (Argentina). Assigned readings include Roosevelt's "The Strenuous Life" (1897), on the importance of manly vigor achieved through military escapades and the necessity of the U.S. occupation of the Philippines; Cecil Rhodes's "Confessions of Faith" (1899), on the link between British character and men's rugged adventure and enterprise in Africa; and Sarmiento's "Barbarism and Civilization" (1854), justifying the extermination of native peoples of the pampa and Patagonia so Argentina could realize manifest destiny and racial homogenization.
One important point in this lesson (and surprise to many students), is that Latin American statesmen, like their U.S. and British counterparts, tied notions of modern masculinity to deeply racist projects of territorial expansion: Latin America is both a site of imperialist intervention and a military aggressor in its own right. Theodore Roosevelt made his name leading a brigade of "Rough Riders" in the 1898 Spanish-American War that placed Cuba under U.S. control; nineteenthcentury Argentina was hugely dependent on British capital. At the same time, Mexico and Brazil had "Indian Wars" similar to Argentina's. Chile militarily seized huge swaths of Bolivia and Peru, with British backing. In this context Latin America appears as something more complex than a passive object of foreign domination.
Yet one must also note the differences between Roosevelt's, Rhodes's, and Sarmiento's masculine ideals and the ways these differences are about a set of connected world inequalities. For Roosevelt and Rhodes, achieving vigorous masculinity is linked to military adventure and achievements in nature or lands inhabited by "primitives." Both men are deeply anxious about the dangers posed by overly urban, industrial life in New York or London, and both see active participation in military ventures, hunting parties, and exploration missions as important counters to effeminate urbanity. For a Latin American statesman such as Sarmiento, the concern and antidote are exactly the inverse: the city (especially Buenos Aires) is the source of masculine civilization. More high culture in literature, theatre, and music (via schools) is his answer, not rough-riding or military adventures. If the Indians are to be exterminated, it will not be Sarmiento who leads the actual charge. Argentina's iconic gauchos (cowboys) are, for Sarmiento, effeminate and weak, racially inbred. Whereas Cecil Rhodes points to the heavy presence of German immigrants in the United States as evidence of U.S. racial degeneration, Sarmiento praises German immigrants in Argentina as models of orderly civilization. Whereas Roosevelt disparages Europe as a place full of dandies, Sarmiento sees cosmopolitan citizens. Where Roosevelt and Rhodes see Latin America and Africa as "not yet fi t" for self-government, Sarmiento defends the Argentine capacity for progress.
These different masculinities speak directly to the global relationship between the United States, Britain, and Argentina in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At that moment, the U.S. was emerging as a serious challenge to British hegemony while, with the collapse of the Spanish empire, Latin America had been suddenly transformed into the inferior stepsister of North America. Anxiety about modernity and masculinity cut multiple ways, and they are intimately connected. Rhodes's sense of a vulnerable British Empire, Roosevelt's desire to establish American exceptionalism and hemispheric leadership, Sarmiento's fears that Argentina is not modern or white enough-what we get by putting these tales in dialogue with each other is a world story in which the portraits of these men are similar and related but not at all the same.
For the early modern period, questions of European empire building are also important questions of world history. Yet it is challenging to narrate the importance of European expansion to global developments without falling into the trap of "all history starts in Europe." One way to avoid this danger is to fold European expansion into a more global story of masculine state formation and empire building. We made this attempt in the context of a course on early world history, which we began not in Europe but in the Americas and with the case of the Inca Empire. For the Inca, control of women was constitutive of masculinity and empire at once. Tribute in women-some of whom were sacrifi ced, others were married to the king or his noblemen, or given to high priests and secluded in temples-was critical to the growth of Inca bureaucracy and control over conquered territories. The compliance of "conquered men" was secured by enabling local elites to determine the allocation of women in marriage. Penultimate control over the distribution of all women marked the king as the most powerful of all men.
This makes for rich comparison and contrast with Christian European developments. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, states in Europe sought to further the process of political centralization through the regulation of gender and the empowerment of some men. This was equally true of Protestant and Catholic parts of Germany as it was of uniformly Catholic countries like Spain. Rulers resorted to metaphors of fatherhood and patriarchal household governance to justify the extension of their powers into realms previously claimed by family members and local networks. They saw it as their divinely ordained task to strengthen paternal authority in society and subject women to male control within marriage or (in Catholic contexts) convents. Through legal changes, state authorities built alliances with male heads of households around shared patriarchal interests, turning them into quasi-bureaucratic agents who had to represent the family vis-à-vis the state but were also empowered to control it internally.
With the Spanish conquest of Mexico and Peru, these European patterns of gendered rulership traveled back to the Americas. One can usefully narrate the colonial encounter as an encounter between distinct conceptions of gender, power, and sexuality, including partially compatible, partially confl icting forms of masculinity. The honorcoded, fi ercely violent masculinity of the conquistador was key to the initial phase of military conquest. The permanent establishment of empire, however, required modulating and directing male affect toward the building of Christian communities on the bedrock of monogamous marriages. Spanish-Catholic marriage practices shaped political, class, and racial hierarchies in the newly emerging colonial urban centers. Priests in the Americas were particularly concerned with enforcing monogamy, cracking down on sexual "irregularities," and prosecuting "witchcraft," which in the former Inca Empire was often associated with female goddess cults.
Juxtaposing these stories of masculinity and empire means remapping global connections. When historians tell the story of "European expansion" during this period, they often look fi rst to Spain (or Portugal), less often to the Inca or Aztec Empires (other than as obstacles to European empire building), and virtually never to the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation. A focus on gender and sexuality makes visible "colonial" Spain's enmeshment in a much broader early modern European culture of sexual regulation. It shows that the German Empire, in spite of its lack of colonies, could still co-fashion technologies of rule that were transferable to colonial contexts. And it highlights that patriarchal empire building in the Americas preceded the arrival of European Christianity with its singular male God and included the Andean world of goddess religions.
At the same time, while masculinity and male power are key to all three political projects-Incan Empire, European state formation, Spanish colonialism-the projects only partially overlap, and they each produce their irreducible differences with one another. The same can be said of the distinct yet related modern imperial enterprises embodied by Roosevelt, Rhodes, and Sarmiento. Tracking such differences in the meaning and deployment of masculinity in imperial contexts is one way to shed light on the complicated mechanisms of empire; as such, our teaching ventures raise new questions and exciting possibilities for research as well.
Although somewhat surprising for a literature dedicated to the exploration of macro-phenomena, within world history, comparative imperial history is a woefully underdeveloped form of global political analysis even as imperial studies have taken off in individual fi elds. The world historian Patrick Manning bemoans this lacuna in his comprehensive account of the state of world history writing in the early twenty-fi rst century, a moment in time when new forms of imperialism together with new forms of globalization are profoundly marking our experience of the "transnational" but apparently not yet transforming the fi eld of world history. "To a remarkable degree," Manning notes, "the study of individual empires has superceded any broad effort to explore the role of empires in world history, to explore the changing institutions of empires, or to investigate the patterns of relationship between empires and other political units." 36 We argue that the historical study of masculinity can serve as a lens for bringing all these dimensions of empire into focus: from the large global dynamics that shape and sustain imperial practice to the inner institutional workings of empire and the manifestations of imperial projects in the smallest political institutions like the family. One step further still, the study of masculinity directs attention to the individual person and the embodied, psycho-social experiences of world historical processes-be they empire building or capitalist expansion in the premodern, modern, or postmodern world.
